[1] In this paper, we show that the rate structure endogeneity may result in a misspecification of the residential water demand function. We propose to solve this endogeneity problem by estimating a probabilistic model describing how water rates are chosen by local communities. This model is estimated on a sample of Canadian local communities. We first show that the pricing structure choice reflects efficiency considerations, equity concerns, and, in some cases, a strategy of price discrimination across consumers by Canadian communities. Hence estimating the residential water demand without taking into account the pricing structures' endogeneity leads to a biased estimation of price and income elasticities. We also demonstrate that the pricing structure per se plays a significant role in influencing price responsiveness of Canadian residential consumers. 
Introduction
[2] In this article, we investigate the issue of pricing structure choice by local municipalities and its implications for residential water demand estimation. More specifically, we estimate residential water demands by assuming that the structure of water prices chosen by municipalities may be endogenous. This implies that some observable and unobservable characteristics of local communities that determine pricing choice may also influence residential water consumption levels. For example, a community facing pollution or scarcity problems may be induced to use increasing block rate pricing which may, in turn, influence water consumption patterns. Moreover, it is likely that these pollution or scarcity problems influence residential water consumption. Therefore estimating water demand without taking into account the endogeneity of the pricing choice may lead to a selectivity bias.
[3] This is an important issue as previous studies have tried to assess the impact of the type of water pricing on water consumption by directly comparing water demand functions [see, e.g., Olmstead et al., 2003] . This comparison is appropriate only if domestic users facing different pricing schemes are identical in all respects, except water prices. However, domestic users are likely to differ in observed economic and demographic characteristics, which in turn induce differences in unobserved preferences for water consumption and for the water tariff choice. Hence attribution of the observed difference in water consumption to the type of water pricing potentially ignores these other differences and leads to a selectivity bias.
[4] In order to avoid this endogeneity bias, we present an econometric model describing how water demand and pricing choice are simultaneously induced by the observable and the unobservable characteristics of domestic users. This framework is used to assess the impact of pricing on residential water consumption in Canada. Canada offers an interesting case study as water and wastewater services are rapidly changing as municipal governments act to preserve the quality of water and rehabilitate supply infrastructure. In the past, Canadian water prices have been criticized on several grounds. The two main criticisms have been that water prices do not reflect the full cost of water services and that water services were not provided on a user pay basis [National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, 1996] . Environment Canada's Municipal Water Pricing survey indicates that in 1999, only 56% of households were equipped with water meters and 44% faced flat rates for water supply [Burke et al., 2001] . As a result, Canadian residential consumers use roughly twice as much per person than in other industrialized countries, with the exception of the United States. A second interesting characteristic of Canadian water rates is that residential users face a great variety of pricing schemes. In some cases, different pricing schemes are used in the same geographical areas and sometimes in the same community. This pricing heterogeneity within geographical areas will allow us to assess the impact of pricing schemes on residential water demand.
[5] We develop our analysis according to the following structure. In section 2 we specify a model to explain pricing choice by local communities and we present unbiased residential water demand functions. Section 3 presents an application to Canadian data. This econometric analysis is to our knowledge the first in Canada to combine water use information derived from Environment Canada's municipal water use and pricing survey and sociodemographic information from Statistics Canada's Census of Population.
Residential Water Demand and Pricing Choice Structures
2.1. Water Pricing as a Rational Choice 2.1.1. Determinants of Pricing Choice
[6] Designing water rates is an important issue for water utilities and local communities. The first objective of a water utility pricing scheme is to generate revenues sufficient to cover costs. However, a pricing rule may also address two other functions: A pricing rule allocates costs between users, and it may provide incentives for efficient use and water conservation. As Baumann et al. [1997] indicate, applying these criteria to determine the best rate structure is not a simple task. First, some of the goals may conflict and require tradeoffs among them. The balance between revenue stability and efficiency of time of use or seasonal prices is an example of such a tradeoff. Moreover, as water services involve high capital investments, a high proportion of expenses are fixed costs which do not vary with the quantity of water consumed. This makes the allocation of costs among users more difficult to achieve.
[7] In practice, a water utility may use different types of pricing: flat rate, constant or uniform rate, increasing block rate or decreasing block rate. Flat rates provide users with an unlimited access to public water services in exchange for a periodic fixed amount of money. As this type of pricing provides no incentive to save on water, most national and international standards recommend against this type of pricing. Under a constant or uniform rate (CUR), the customer pays a constant charge per cubic meter. In contrast, in a block rate pricing system, the marginal price varies according to the block (or blocks) into which water use falls. Increasing block rates (IBR) are such that the marginal price increases for successive quantities of water [Baumann et al., 1997] . In the case of decreasing marginal prices, the price structure is termed decreasing block rates (DBR). Block rate pricing may solve the problem of excess profits and losses generated by marginal cost pricing in the case of economies and diseconomies of scale, respectively. IBR can also be used to transmit water scarcity information to consumers. One drawback is to make the revenue of the water utility more variable as consumers, by reducing their water consumption, can switch from one price block to another. Lastly, some more complex pricing schemes can be used by the water utilities. Those complex pricing schemes take some characteristics of the IBR and DBR structures. The marginal price can increase on the first blocks and then decrease to favor very large water consumers. Without being exhaustive, other pricing schemes include volumetric charges that vary by pipe size, and peak load pricing. The range of possible pricing methods and their relative efficiency properties is discussed by Brown and Sibley [1986] .
[8] We are interested in understanding why local communities choose a particular price structure. As mentioned previously, municipal choices may be influenced by numerous elements including equity considerations, existence of local interest groups and environmental factors. Even if it is quite difficult to classify the reasons that could explain price structure choice, we may distinguish among three categories. A first concern of a local municipality may be efficiency. The price structure must be welfare maximizing in order to be efficient. In addition, the cost accounting upon which pricing rests must reflect the full, social costs of water supply and sewage treatment [see Renzetti and Kushner, 2004] . A second basis for choosing the structure of water prices is related to equity. Equity, as defined by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [2003] , has four basic dimensions: equity among income groups, among consumer types, among regions and intergenerational equity. The first dimension is perhaps the most important for water pricing. This is because water is a basic necessity and expenditure on potable water typically declines as a share of income as income rises. As a result, raising water prices has the potential to be regressive in its impacts. A variety of methods for designing pricing schedules to cope with equity concerns have been proposed. These pricing schedules include baseline rates in which a specific quantity of water is supplied at no cost to all households; see the discussion by Hall and Hanemann [1996] . Third, a determinant of the pricing structure choice can be a desire to implement price discrimination. Price discrimination arises when different consumer groups face different prices for what is effectively the same good or service. A key issue is whether the price differences are efficient. This can occur when price differences reflect differences in the marginal cost of supply or when a utility with imperfect information regarding customer characteristics designs a nonlinear pricing structure that allows consumers to self-select and, as a result, face differing prices. Unfortunately, water utilities in Canada have a history of inefficient price discrimination that is not supported by these considerations [Renzetti, 1999] . The work by Hewitt [2000] is one of the few empirical papers that has investigated the issue of pricing structure choice by water utilities. Hewitt [2000] shows that under sunnier, warmer and drier weather conditions, utilities in the United States are more likely to adopt IBR structures. This result is consistent with rational price discrimination as water needs are more heterogeneous under such conditions. A last reason explaining why some municipalities prefer using a flat rate is risk aversion. By recovering their operating and capital costs through flat rates (instead of volumetric rates), municipalities reduce financial risks which may derive from the relative volatility of water consumption. A negative consequence of flat rates is, of course, that they provide an environmentally damaging and economically misleading signal to consumers.
Specifying the Pricing Choice Model
[9] We now briefly present the model describing the choice of pricing structure by a local community. Let U ij denotes the maximum utility of the representative household i when the municipality has chosen to implement the pricing structure j, j = {CUR, IBR, DBR, FLAT}. We assume that this utility can be written as
where z i is the vector of exogenous variables having an impact on the representative household's surplus and the h ij are error terms. Then, based on the random utility model, the probability of the municipality i choosing the pricing structure j is given by
Combining these two equations gives
The probability associated with the pricing structure j depends on the utility derived by the municipality when implementing other price structures. The calculation of these probabilities heavily depends on the probability distribution of the error term h j . Assuming first that the error term is normally distributed leads to the multinomial probit model. However, because of the need to evaluate multiple integrals, the most widely used assumption is that the error terms of the selection equation are independent and identically Gumbel distributed [see Greene, 2003] . This leads to the familiar multinomial logit model:
where V ij (z i ) = z i Á g j and the g j are parameters to be estimated. There are two underlying assumptions that merit discussion. First, the pricing structure choice is assumed to maximize the municipality's social surplus (that is, the price structure is efficient and reflects consumer's preferences). Second, the multinomial logit approach emphasizes differences across municipalities since the vector of exogenous variables in (1) is specific to individuals. Another approach, corresponding to the multinomial conditional logit model, would have been to consider exogenous variables varying across alternatives. However, since we believe that the pricing structure choice is more driven by municipality characteristics than by the attributes of the choices, we have chosen the multinomial logit specification. The multinomial logit model will be estimated by maximum likelihood. In order to avoid indeterminacy in the model, the model is estimated for all categories but one, the latter being the reference category for which all elements of the vector are normalized to zero. Assessing the impact of pricing structures on residential water consumption requires the correct specification of the water demand function. Two issues related to water price specification have been particularly investigated.
[11] The first issue is the adequate representation of price in the demand function. Of particular importance here is the debate over the use of the marginal or average price [see Taylor et al., 2004] . The discussion related to the water price most relevant to consumers has a long history. Howe and Linaweaver [1967] argued that residential consumers are more likely to react to the average rather than to the marginal price. Later, Shin [1985] introduced a ''perceived'' price computed as a combination of the marginal and the average price. Another approach has been followed by Chicoine and Ramamurthy [1986] , who estimate a demand function using the marginal price. Because the econometric results have been mixed, there is still now no clear consensus on the correct specification. For some researchers, including Nieswiadomy and Cobb [1993] and Howe [1998] , the relevant price in the residential water demand is the average one. This view has been recently challenged by Taylor et al. [2004] , who conclude that the marginal price specification should be preferred.
[12] A second price specification issue arises when consumers face block rate pricing. Under such a pricing scheme, it is difficult to determine the price specification that should be used for estimating the demand function [Martínez-Espiñeira, 2003 ]. Most of the water demand models employ a combination of the marginal price and a ''difference'' variable, which aims to capture the income effect implied by the block rate structure; see Nordin [1976] and, more recently, Martínez-Espiñeira [2002] for an application to Spain. Perhaps because of the small income effect associated with the difference variable, many researchers have found it exhibits an insignificant coefficient. More recently, it has been recognized that the price is endogenous under a block rate tariff and estimation techniques such as instrumental variables (two-stage least square), are required. As suggested by Hewitt and Hanemann [1995] , the correct specification of the water demand under multiple-block tariffs requires a two-stage model where the consumer first selects the block in which to consume and then chooses the quantity within that block.
[13] In addition to these specification issues, assessing whether the pricing structure per se plays a significant role in influencing price responsiveness has recently emerged as an important topic in the literature on residential water demand. Espey et al. [1997] conducted a meta-analysis of US residential water demand price elasticities based on 124 estimates published between 1967 and 1993. The authors report that a significant difference among elasticity estimates can be related to pricing schemes. Dalhuisen et al. [2003] have conducted another meta-analysis on the variations in price and in income elasticities for residential water demand based on 51 published articles. They conclude that the presence of increasing block rate pricing, ceritus paribus, leads to estimated residential water demands being more elastic, whereas it lowers income elasticities. Decreasing block rate pricing on the contrary does not affect the magnitude of the price and income elasticities. In a more recent work, Olmstead et al. [2003] analyzed price sensitivity of water consumption for 1082 households located in 11 urban areas in the United States and in Canada and facing uniform marginal prices, two-tier or four-tier increas-ing block structures. Estimating separately the water demands, Olmstead et al. [2003] conclude that households facing block prices are more sensitive to price and income changes than households facing uniform prices.
[14] Although previous empirical studies have shown that residential water demand's price sensitivity appears to be related to the type of water pricing, the exact nature of the relationship between price structures and household water demands has not been yet addressed adequately. The main reason is that separating the share of differences in price elasticities related to the price structure from the part resulting from other determinants is very difficult in practice. First, the average water price may be higher in local communities using block rate pricing than uniform prices. This is especially true if the choice of adopting the block rate pricing has resulted from water quality or scarcity problems. In such a case, a higher price sensitivity of the residential water demand is more likely driven by the higher average price than by the increasing bloc rate per se. Another reason proposed by Olmstead et al. [2003] is that the unobserved heterogeneity in local communities implementing different price structures can be correlated with factors that explain the price elasticity. For instance, if an increasing bloc rate were implemented to provide consumers with incentives to save water because of repeated droughts, it is likely that domestic users would have invested in water-conserving equipments. In such a case, it is the unobserved differences in capital equipment that mainly drive the differences in price sensitivity, and not the price structure per se.
Correcting for the Endogeneity Bias
[15] For all local communities i = 1,. . ., I facing a pricing rate j 2 {CUR, IBR, DBR, FLAT}, we wish to estimate the parameters of residential water demand function defined by the following equation:
where y i is the consumption of the representative household, p i and I i denote the water price (representing both water supply and the sewage treatment services) and the representative household income, respectively. Z i is a vector of exogenous variables assumed to influence water consumption and e i is the usual error term. The doublelog model is the most common specification in the residential water demand literature. As a result, we have adopted this model in order to facilitate comparison to other studies. Furthermore, the specification implies that coefficient estimates are also elasticity estimates. From (5), the demand equation coefficients may differ across communities using different water price structures.
[16] If the pricing choice were the result of a random selection process, then using ordinary least squares (OLS) would result in consistent estimates of the parameters (a 1 j , a 2 j , a 3 j ) 8j. However, as discussed above, some observable and unobservable characteristics of the local communities that determine the pricing choice may also influence residential water consumption levels. As a result, we may have E(e i ) 6 ¼ 0 and OLS will result in biased coefficients. In order to derive unbiased estimates, Lee [1983] has proposed a generalization of the two-step selection bias correction method introduced by Heckman [1979] to the case where selectivity is modeled as a multinomial logit. Lee's approach requires two steps. First, using the multinomial logit model we compute for each observation i the inverse of the Mill's ratio (m i j ) associated with the observed pricing regime j, m i j = j(h i j )/F(h i j ) where j refers to the standard normal density function, F to the cumulative standard normal distribution function, and h i j = F À1 (P ij ). Second, this term is then substituted into the demand equation which becomes
In this equation the coefficient of the Mill's ratio, s j , measures the correlation between the error term of the selection equation and the error term of the demand equation. A significant coefficient indicates that the pricing choice is not random. In that case, any estimation of the residential water demand based on the specification described by (5) will lead to biased coefficients.
3. An Application to the Canadian Residential Water Demands 3.1. Database [17] The data used to analyze the impact of prices and price structure on Canadian residential water demand have been provided by Environment Canada and Statistics Canada. A complete list of the variables used together with their definition can be found in Table A1 . More than half of 899 local communities in our sample use a flat tariff, volumetric water pricing being implemented in 40.1% of the municipalities.
[18] Table 1 indicates that the characteristics of local communities using flat or volumetric tariff are quite different. First, local communities implementing flat tariffs are smaller than those implementing volumetric pricing. The metering cost and the administrative expenses required to implement volumetric pricing might help explain this situation. Second, local communities implementing flat tariffs correspond to areas having experienced in the past a limited number of problems with water quality (such as bacteria growth or the presence of coliforms or giardia) and/or with water quantity (drought or low water table). Third, local communities using a flat tariff seem to provide a more basic service to final users. For instance, approximately half of these municipalities do not directly treat wastewater.
[19] The results of differences in pricing structures on water consumption per household and price level have been highlighted by previous Canadian studies, see Burke et al. [2001] . First, residential water consumers facing a flat rate have significantly higher water consumption than those facing a volumetric rate. With 15.53 m 3 , the monthly water consumption of a household facing a flat rate is 54% higher than the average consumption in case of a CUR (67% higher in the case of IBR and 76% in case of DBR). One obvious explanation of these differences is that flat rates do not provide any incentive to water saving. A higher water consumption could also result from a lower price, on average. Interestingly, this is not the case here as the average price for 10 m 3 with a flat rate is similar to the average price with the other types of pricing. This very preliminary analysis of de-scriptive statistics tends to support the idea that the structure of water pricing has an impact per se on water demand.
[20] The main conclusion to be drawn is that the characteristics of local communities (water scarcity, characteristics of the average household, characteristics of housing) appear to differ according to the type of pricing implemented (flat rate, CUR, IBR or DBR). This result indicates that a good understanding of the pricing choice by the local communities in Canada is a prerequisite for estimating the sensitivity of residential water demands.
Estimating the Pricing Choice Model
[21] In equation (4), the vector of exogenous variables, z, reflects the four main motivations that drive the pricing choice of a local community: efficiency, equity, price discrimination and stability of revenues.
[22] The efficiency objective requires equalizing price to marginal cost. As we expect the cost to increase with the complexity of the service, we include variables such as the average biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) of effluents (bod_inflow), the share of groundwater in total water supply (groundwater), the share of the population without any sewage plant (no_sewage) to reflect cost determinants. In order to capture some equity objectives of the local communities, the unemployment rate (unemployment), the share of the population without any earned income (income2) and the ratio of the domestic water consumption to the total water consumption (domestic) have been included as determinants of the pricing choice. Price discrimination should be more effective in the case of very heterogeneous consumers. The ratio of the difference between median and average incomes to the average income (income3) and the standard error of the average income (income4) have been included. Some other variables such as the share of rural population (rural) aim at capturing other forms of heterogeneity across consumers. Last, the revenue stability criterion may appear more important in small local communities unable to diversify risk. A categorical variable representing the size of the municipality (size) has been included to capture such effect.
[23] In Table 2 we report the estimates of the multinomial logit model aiming at identifying determinants of pricing structure choice by Canadian municipalities. Table 2 gives the estimated coefficients for CUR, IBR and DBR, the reference category being flat rates.
[24] Before turning to the estimates, we need first to address the issue of the quality of the pricing choice model. First, the pseudo R 2 (based on a comparison between the log likelihood of the model with and without regressors) is equal to 0.33. Second, using a likelihood ratio test we are able to reject the null hypothesis of all coefficients of the model equaling to zero. Third, as it will be discussed, all estimated coefficients conform to prior expectations. We may also compare the observed pricing choice and the predicted pricing choice. The econometric model correctly predicts the price structure choice for 656 municipalities out of 899 observations (a correct prediction means that the model gives the highest probability of being chosen to the type of tariff actually chosen). This implies a success rate of 73% for the total sample.
[25] A first determinant of pricing choice by local communities is the quality of the environment, and in particular, the quality of raw water. The BOD of raw water (bod_inflow) has a positive and significant impact on the probability of using volumetric rates. If raw water requires important treatment prior to use and, as a consequence, leads to higher costs, volumetric pricing is more likely to be implemented. A second determinant of the pricing choice is the complexity of the water and wastewater services to be provided to final users. Local communities providing basic water and wastewater services tend to be more likely to use flat rate pricing. Services without water disinfection or without any treatment prior to use have a lower probability of using a volumetric pricing. This effect is especially significant for services using CUR or DBR. These two determinants tend to show that municipalities try to mimic their water supply and sewage costs through the use of block rate pricing.
[26] Some characteristics of the households seem to be important determinants of the pricing choice. This is especially the case for the average consumer's income. First, having an important proportion of the population without any earned income (income2) decreases the probability of using a volumetric pricing. This may correspond to a kind of social pricing for the poorest population who only pay a small fixed charge for the water service. This type of social objective is also visible in the sign of the coefficient associated with the unemployment rate (unemployment). The higher is the rate of unemployment, the lower is the probability of using volumetric water rates. However, it is also interesting to notice that the more households differ according to their income (within a given municipality), the higher is the probability of the municipality using volumet- The average water charge combines charges for water supply and sewage treatment.
ric pricing (especially decreasing or increasing bloc rates). The variables measuring the proportional difference between the median and average income of the representative household (income3) and the standard deviation of the average income (income4) both increase significantly the probability of using volumetric pricing. Moreover, the coefficients of these two variables are especially high in the case of increasing and decreasing block rates. This would indicate that local communities use the structure of water pricing, in part, in order to discriminate between consumers when income heterogeneity is high, that is when the gain to be expected from price discrimination is important. The dwelling characteristics also appear to be a determinant of the pricing choice. Local communities with a high proportion of individual houses (dwelling_ind) have a higher probability of using either a decreasing block rate or an increasing block rate structure. It is likely that outdoor uses of water are more important in case of individual houses than in case of apartment buildings. Using block rates allows municipalities to discriminate between indoor water use that may be viewed as a necessity and outdoor uses that possess some characteristics of a luxury good. Municipalities where domestic water consumption represents a high proportion of total consumption (domestic) have a lower probability of using volumetric prices. In addition, services using volumetric rate structures also tend to operate in urban areas with higher population density (the density variable has a positive and significant effect on CUR and DBR). Last, a geographic effect is captured through the longitude variable (longitude) and a latitude variable (latitude).
[27] Thus three objectives of the local municipalities seem to emerge as being relevant to their choice of water pricing structure. First, by adopting multiple block price structures, local water agencies try to reflect their cost structure. In such a case, the water pricing choice results from economic efficiency motives. Second, the choice of pricing structure may also reflect some social goals of the municipalities (flat rate structures are more often used in areas where the proportion of the population without any income is higher). Last, price discrimination among consumers (poor versus rich, outdoor versus indoor use, etc.) appears to be an important determinant of the price structure choice by the municipalities.
Estimating Unbiased Residential Water Demands
[28] We now turn to estimating residential water demands while accounting for the endogeneity of the pricing structure. An important issue concerns the specification of the price. For the municipalities having implemented a CUR, the price to be included in the demand is the marginal price. For municipalities having chosen a multiple block rate (IBR or DBR), specifying the water price is a more complex issue: the marginal price is endogenous as the consumer self-selects into a given block. In order to get unbiased price elasticities, the marginal price has been first instrumentalized (instruments used include the marginal price for 10, 25, and 35 m 3 /month, the upper bound of the first block, the lower bound of the last block, the number of blocks and some socioeconomic variables describing the average household. Results are available from the authors upon request). The residential water demand equations were also estimated using the average price but as this variable did not appear to be significant, we only report estimations with the instrumentalized marginal price. Estimating a residential water demand for consumers facing flat rates is a challenging issue as the marginal price of water faced by a residential household is zero. It follows that the optimal water consumption should be such that the marginal utility is zero. As a consequence, only socioeconomic variables that determine the preferences of the representative consumer should enter the demand function, and no price variable should appear. However, in the demand function, we include the average price for two main reasons. First, in the case of a flat tariff, a consumer may anticipate that high water consumption by all households of the local municipality will necessarily result in high flat rates in order to cover the water utility's operational costs. Hence implicitly the price depends on the consumer's consumption. Second, it is also possible that, although a perfectly well informed consumer will realize that the marginal price under a flat rate is zero, an imperfectly informed consumer may perceive a positive marginal charge.
[29] In sections 3.3.1 -3.3.4 we report and discuss the estimation results. We organize our discussion by type of pricing structure.
Local Communities With Constant Unit Rates (CUR)
[30] The Mill's ratio in Table 3 is significant at 1%. This means that the pricing structure is endogenous: interpreting directly the OLS estimates would result in erroneous conclusions. For example, the price elasticity of the water demand is estimated to be À0.16 using OLS whereas taking into account the endogeneity of the pricing structure we estimate an elasticity equal to À0.11. Estimating directly the demand function without taking into account the choice of pricing structure would result in an overestimation of the consumer price sensitivity.
[31] We turn now to the main socioeconomic determinants of the residential water demand. First, being located in a small community with a high proportion of rural inhabitants living in individual houses results in a lower water consumption per household, on average. The variable size which describes the size of the local community has a negative and significant sign in the demand function. This is also the case for the proportion of individual houses (dwelling_ind) and for the proportion of rural inhabitants (rural). One possible explanation is that consumers in such areas may have more easily access to alternative water supply sources (such as private wells) than consumers located in more urbanized areas. Another interpretation is that groundwater pumping may reflect consumer's preferences for high water quality. For CUR, the price is the marginal price (in logarithms); for IBR and DBR, the price is the instrumentalized marginal price (in logarithms); for FLAT rate the price is the average price for 25 m 3 /month (in logarithms).
[32] Second, the income effect appears to be an important determinant of water consumption as the income variable (income) is significant at 15%. This is an interesting finding as many previous studies on residential water demands have found that income is not always an important determinant of water consumption. Moreover, the number of rooms per dwelling has a positive effect on the water consumption. This can also be interpreted as an indirect effect of consumer's wealth on water consumption. Last, some geographical effects are captured by the longitude and latitude variables. Such variables may capture a climate effect that has not been included in the demand function due to a lack of data defined at the community level.
[33] Last, it is interesting to interpret the coefficient of the Mill's ratio. The Mill's ratio reflects the link between the probability of adopting a constant unit rate and the average water consumption per household. This coefficient is significant and negative: for the municipalities having chosen a CUR, the probability of such a choice decreases with the water consumption. In other words, a high level of water consumption is associated with a low probability of using a constant rate structure.
Local Communities With Increasing Block Rates (IBR)
[34] As only 35 municipalities use an IBR structure, the number of exogenous variables entering the model has to be limited in order to get consistent estimates. First, the Mill's ratio is significant indicating that the pricing structure is endogenous. The price elasticity appears to be rather high, À0.25, whereas income does not have a significant impact on water consumption. A possible reason why correcting for endogeneity alters the estimated price elasticity is that, in the absence of the correction, the estimated elasticity may be capturing the effects of nonprice factors such as water conservation policies (established in concert with IBR) or consumer preferences (that supported election of local governments who, in turn, adopted IBR). Water consumption increases with the proportion of dwellings built after 1991. More recently built dwellings may have multiple bathrooms or a swimming pool leading to higher water use. The proportion of individual houses also affects positively the average consumption per household. A larger outdoor water use can be an explanation for this positive impact. A positive and significant effect of the proportion of rural inhabitants on the water consumption must be noticed and may reflect greater outdoor water use. As in the CUR case, some geographical effects (such as climate) are captured by the longitude and latitude variables. The average household water consumption increases with the longitude and decreases with the latitude of the local community. Last, the coefficient of the Mill's ratio is positive: for the municipalities having chosen an IBR, the probability of such a choice increases with water consumption. In other words, a high level of water consumption is associated with a high probability of using an increasing block rate structure. This may reflect the municipalities' goal of using water pricing as a tool to encourage water conservation.
Local Communities With Decreasing Block Rates (DBR)
[35] First, the Mill's ratio is significant. Second, there is a large difference between the price elasticity estimated with the 2-ST approach and with OLS. With an instumentalized marginal price, the estimated price elasticity is equal to À0.20 using the OLS method and equal to À0.10 using the 2-ST approach. Once again, this means that a simple regression on the DBR sample would result in an overestimation of the price sensitivity of Canadian residential water demands. The water demand with a DBR structure appears inelastic but not perfectly so. Household income is not an important determinant of water consumption as this variable is not significant in any specification. However, some variables possibly related to the household's income have significant impacts. For example, municipalities with a high proportion of individual houses have a higher water consumption per household. The proportion of dwellings built after 1991 also has a positive impact on the consumption (significant at 15%). Last, the coefficient of the Mill's ratio is significant at 1% and negative in the complete model. The probability of a municipality choosing a DBR decreases with water consumption. In other words, a low level of water consumption will be associated with a high probability of using an decreasing block rate structure.
Local Communities With Flat Rates
[36] The price specification used here corresponds to the average price for a monthly water consumption equal to 25 m 3 . Recall that this price reflects both water supply and sewage treatment services. In addition, note that the Mills ratio is significant indicating that the pricing structure is endogenous. Moreover, the coefficient of the Mill's ratio is positive: for the municipalities having chosen a flat rate, the probability of such a choice increases with the water consumption. In other words, a high level of water consumption will be associated with a high probability of using a flat rate.
[37] The goodness of fit of this model is lower than that of the other models with a R 2 varying from 0.10 to 0.14. As the consumer faces a zero marginal price, it is possible that some households limit their water consumption because they have strong environmental preferences. Such preferences may not be captured by the exogenous variables of our model. As it could be expected, the average price has no impact on the representative household's consumption decision. The income elasticity varies between 0.25 and 0.27. However, the coefficient associated with the income variable is only significant at 15 or 20%. The main determinants of the water demand are the following. First, the water consumption per household decreases as the proportion of groundwater increases. A possible explanation is that groundwater can be used by consumers to satisfy lowquality water needs such that car washing or gardening. The proportion of houses built before 1960 has a negative effect on the level of water consumption. Old dwellings may also correspond to old water networks, where water leaks are important. A geographical effect can once again be highlighted: the water consumption increases with longitude.
Does Price Structure Endogeneity Matter for Estimating Residential Water Demands?
[38] There are two potential answers to this question. First, we have shown that, using the multinomial logit model, we can estimate and predict the pricing choice of municipalities. This means that this choice is not random and, on the contrary, reflects specific objectives of the municipality and preferences of the representative household. This may be an important result for policy makers. Incentive water pricing such that IBR structures are more and more often proposed by public authorities in charge of the water sector regulation as a benchmark for the tariffs that should be implemented. However, as the pricing choice seems to be the result of an optimization program by the municipalities, it is likely that the public authority will face some resistance when trying to induce pricing changes.
[39] Second, as all the coefficients associated to the Mill's ratio in the four water demand estimations (CUR, IBR, DBR, and flat rates) are significant, the pricing structure is related to the level of residential water consumption. As shown in Table 4 , estimating residential water demands using simple OLS leads to a misspecification of price and income elasticities. For instance, according to the OLS estimation results, the price elasticity of the demand is not significantly different in the case of IBR or DBR (À0.20 Here pc for pricing choice model and wd for water demand model. and À0.22, respectively). However, taking into account the selectivity bias results in a much lower price elasticity in case of IBR (À0.10). It follows that correcting for pricing structure endogeneity is a relevant and important issue, at least in the Canadian case.
[40] Last, the results in Table 4 allow us to assess the impact per se of pricing structures on the Canadian residential water demand. The strongest price sensitivity is found in the case of IBR: a 10% price increase is predicted to result in a 2.5% decrease of the water consumption. The Canadian residential water demand price elasticity belongs to the range of values found by studies having investigated residential water demand in North America [see, e.g., Nieswiadomy and Cobb, 1993] . It is not surprising to find the highest price elasticity in absolute value in municipalities having implemented IBR as such a pricing structure gives the strongest incentive for water saving. Second, consumers facing a CUR or a DBR are only half as sensitive to water prices. Facing a 10% price increase, they will reduce their water consumption by around 1%. To conclude, each pricing structure exhibits a specific impact on residential water demands.
Conclusion
[41] We have estimated a residential water demand function while taking into account the fact that some observable and unobservable characteristics of local communities determine pricing choice and also influence residential water consumption levels. In the application to Canadian residential water demands, we have shown that pricing structures endogeneity should be taken into account to derive unbiased price and income elasticities.
[42] There are two main policy implications to be drawn from this research. First, a model explaining a municipality's choice of water pricing structure can be constructed. This choice appears to reflect a combination of efficiency considerations, equity concerns and, in some cases, a strategy of price discrimination across consumers. As the pricing choice is the result of the local community optimization, inducing pricing changes (for example a move from a flat rate toward volumetric rates) may require the use of incentive tools from the public authorities (for instance subsidies for implementing universal metering). Second, after having corrected for pricing structure endogeneity, the estimated price elasticity of the Canadian residential water demands still significantly differ according to implemented pricing schemes (0.02 for FLAT rates and À0.16, À0.25, and À0.10 for CUR, IBR, and DBR, respectively). This means that the pricing structure per se plays a significant role in influencing price responsiveness of Canadian residential consumers. A move toward more incentive pricing schemes such as IBR structures should lower residential water consumption, even if the average or the marginal price does not increase. This would suggest that the public authority should focus as much on the type of water rate structure implemented as on the level of prices.
Appendix A: Database
[43] The data have been provided by Environment Canada (municipal water pricing database, municipal water use database), by Statistics Canada (2001 Canadian municipal census) and have been collected directly by the authors of this article.
[44] The main source of data on water consumption and water prices has been provided by the Municipal Water Pricing Database (MUP). This database is designed to provide data on water and wastewater pricing from over 1200 Canadian municipalities. It includes municipal water and wastewater pricing structures of Canadian municipalities for residential, commercial and industrial uses. This database is regularly updated by Environment Canada.
[45] The Municipal Water Use Database (MUD) provides basic data on municipal water and wastewater systems. This database contains water and sewage systems information from 1359 Canadian municipalities. The first set of data is from a federal and provincial inventory of municipal water works and water treatment facilities published in 1975. It has been updated by Environment Canada in 1986 , 1989 , 1991 , 1994 , 1996 [46] Socioeconomic variables come from the 2001 Canadian municipal census. The Census of Population provides the population and dwelling counts for each province, each territory, and for smaller geographic units such as cities or districts within cities. The census also provides information about Canadian's demographic, social and economic characteristics.
[47] The above data sets have been augmented by some other variables collected by the authors. These variables include the proportion of the population reliant on groundwater (at the Province level), the proportion of area devoted to freshwater bodies (lakes, rivers, etc.). In Table A1 we present all variables used together with their definitions.
